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Abstract
Despite the fact that blackmail constitutes a voluntary transaction between two parties, it is
deemed to be a criminal offence in most legal systems. Traditional economic approach to this
so-called ‘paradox of blackmail’ emphasizes welfare loss generated by the costly rentseeking activities of potential blackmailers as the primary justification for its criminalization.
This argument however does not extend to cases in which potentially damaging information
about the victim was acquired by the blackmailer at no cost. It also does not seem to shed
light on a related puzzle: why is it legal for a potential victim to bribe the other party with the
purpose of achieving the same final outcome (suppression of information) as in the case of
blackmail? This paper addresses these questions in a simple model of bargaining under
asymmetric information which is used as a unified framework for studying both blackmail
and bribery. Under asymmetric information the bargaining outcome is not efficient regardless
of the distribution of the bargaining power. However, when the blackmailer is the monopolist
seller of the information inefficiency results from his demands being too high relative to the
social optimum, providing justification for the practice of penalizing blackmail. On the other
hand, when a victim is the monopolist buyer of the information the equilibrium offer is
inefficiently low implying that its punishment would be counterproductive. These arguments
provide further support for the claim that under reasonable assumptions criminalization of
blackmail can be justified on efficiency grounds.
1 Introduction
According to the standard definition, blackmail occurs when someone is threatened with a
disclosure of potentially damaging information unless they agree to pay a monetary
compensation to the threatening party. The “paradox of blackmail” refers to the fact that
while both, threatening to reveal information and asking for money are legal acts if
performed separately, taken together they constitute a crime (Lindgren, 1984). This paradox
raises a number of difficult questions which over the years have received considerable
attention from legal scholars.2 Katz and Lindgren (1993), for example, argue that “… one
cannot think about coercion, contracts, consent, robbery, rape, unconstitutional conditions,
nuclear deterrence, assumption of risk, the greater-includes-lesser arguments, plea bargains,
settlements, sexual harassment, insider trading, bribery, domination, secrecy, privacy, law
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enforcement, utilitarianism and deontology without being tripped up repeatedly by the
paradox of blackmail.” The criminalization of blackmail also seems to contradict the logic of
economic efficiency. If the blackmailer has a legal right to reveal the information and the
victim knows that the threat is credible, wouldn’t the victim be better off having an option of
preventing the damage caused by the revelation at some cost?
The traditional economic approach to the paradox of blackmail points out that in some
cases it can be socially optimal to punish blackmail. In particular, Coase (1988) and Ginsburg
and Shechtman (1993) argue that if blackmail were legal, large amounts of resources would
be spent on collecting information about potential victims which would then be used to
substantiate blackmailers’ demands. Alternatively, potential victims might choose to incur
large costs by taking actions which reduce their chances of being blackmailed. In both cases,
the expenditure of real resources to redistribute, or prevent redistribution of wealth from one
individual to another would produce a net social loss. Therefore prohibition of blackmail
improves social welfare. Recently a comprehensive analysis of this argument in the context
of a formal game-theoretic model of the interaction between a blackmailer and a potential
victim was provided by Gomez and Ganuza (2002). They show that criminalization of
blackmail could be understood as a correction of the misaligned incentives to engage in rentseeking behavior on the part of the blackmailer.
However, an argument based on the assumption of costly information acquisition can
offer only a partial solution to the paradox of blackmail. As pointed out by Lindgren (1989),
the Ginsburg-Shechtman-Coase (GSC) theory of blackmail is not applicable when the
blackmailer acquires information serendipitously and at no cost. Lindgren further
substantiates this argument by drawing on the work of Hepworth (1975), who identified four
different types of blackmail: participant blackmail, which occurs as a result of a prior
relationship between the blackmailer and the victim; opportunistic blackmail, based on
accidentally acquired information; commercial research blackmail, based on the information
which was acquired on purpose; and entrepreneurial blackmail, in which the blackmailer
himself creates a set of circumstances involving the victim which are then used to
substantiate blackmailers demands. Lindgren (1989) argues that the GSC theory of blackmail
is incomplete because it cannot be applied to the cases of participant and opportunistic
blackmail.
Another common criticism of the rent-seeking argument for the criminalization of
blackmail is that it seems to ignore the so-called paradox of bribery. As noted by DeLong
(1993, p.1664), “it is not unlawful for one who knows another’s secret to accept an offer of
2

payment made by an unthreatened victim in return for a potential blackmailer’s promise not
to disclose the secret. What would otherwise be an unlawful blackmail exchange is a lawful
sale of secrecy if it takes the form of a ‘bribe’. Lawful bribery poses an obvious challenge to
theories that are premised on either the wrongfulness or wastefulness of the blackmail
exchange…”

Thus, the identity of the party making the offer seems to be of crucial

importance when determining whether a given negotiation constitutes a crime or is a form of
lawful bargaining.
This paper attempts to address the paradoxes of blackmail and bribery in a unified
framework by drawing attention to the possible role of asymmetric information in justifying
the criminalization of blackmail. It considers a situation in which the blackmailer obtains
damaging information about a potential victim at no cost and decides whether to disclose it
and receive a non-negative payoff (market price of information) or to demand a payment
from the victim for suppressing it. The disclosure of the information imposes a damage on the
victim, whose willingness to pay to avoid this disclosure is not known by the blackmailer.
The victim, on the other hand, might not know the market price of information faced by the
blackmailer. Under these assumptions both blackmail and bribery can be analysed in the
framework of bilateral trade under asymmetric information, the problem which was
extensively studied at least since Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
To emphasize the differences between blackmail and bribery this paper studies two
extreme allocations of bargaining power. The first one corresponds to the regime of legal
blackmail, in which case the blackmailer is assumed to be able to make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the potential victim. The second configuration corresponds to the situation in which
blackmail is criminalized and the potential victim is the monopolist buyer of the information.
It is further assumed that in both configurations the parties can enter into a legally
enforceable contract for the non-disclosure of information. Under the regime of legal
blackmail, the blackmailer performs an important role in screening victim types by offering
them an opportunity to avoid the information disclosure if their damage is large enough
compared to the market price. This might seem to imply that blackmail should not be
punished. However, because in equilibrium the blackmailer’s demand is higher than the
market price, information will be revealed too often compared to the social optimum.
Therefore some form of regulatory remedy might be desirable. In particular, the optimal
penalty would increase the cost of rejection to the blackmailer and induce him to lower his
equilibrium demand. The opposite conclusion is reached under the assumption that all of the
bargaining power lies with the potential victim. In this case the equilibrium offer is too low
3

compared

to

the

social

optimum,

implying

that

punishing

bribery

would

be

counterproductive. This simple argument provides a clear rationale for the distinct treatment
of blackmail and bribery by legal codes and shows that criminalization of blackmail can be
justified on efficiency grounds even in the absence of wasteful rent seeking on the part of
blackmailer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
blackmail and studies the welfare properties of the bargaining equilibrium. In section 3 the
analysis of bribery is presented. Section 4 presents a discussion of the results and concluding
remarks.
2 Blackmail
Consider a hypothetical situation of a reporter who obtains a piece of information that is
potentially damaging to a celebrity. This information could be sold to a newspaper at the
market price, in which case the victim would suffer damage due to reputation loss, the
magnitude of which is known only to the victim. On the other hand, the two parties could
reach an agreement under which the celebrity would pay the reporter a sum of money in
exchange for the promise of silence. The paper will focus on the properties of the equilibrium
bargaining outcome assuming that both sides of the transaction are risk-neutral utility
maximizers. The approach taken here is similar to the framework used in the study of pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information (Bebchuk, 1984; Nalebuff, 1987; Daughety
and Reinganum, 1994), which typically rely on the ultimatum game setup in which one party
has private information about the damage it would suffer in case no agreement is reached.3
The next section develops the main argument in favor of punishing blackmail under the
assumption that the market price of information reflects its full social value. The subsequent
section discusses how the relaxation of this assumption would affect the main qualitative
results.

2.1 Model of Blackmail
Let p  0 denote the market price of the information, and let L be the damage suffered by
the victim if the information is revealed. The potential victim of the blackmail knows the
value of L with certainty, while the blackmailer’s beliefs about L are summarized by the
3

An important difference between the pretrial negotiation literature and the current model is that in the former
the private information of the victim about damages affects the payoffs of both parties if the case goes to trial. In
the case of blackmail, on the other hand, the damage done to the victim does not affect the blackmailer’s payoff
if the offer is rejected.
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cumulative distribution function F () , which is assumed to be continuously differentiable and
log-concave.4 Because the social value of the information disclosure is equal to p  L , an
efficient outcome involves the disclosure of the information when p  L , while nondisclosure is optimal if p  L . If there were no blackmailer, the celebrity would have an
incentive to disclose the information if and only if p  L , and the outcome would be
efficient. The presence of the blackmailer who does not bear the cost of information
disclosure creates a negative externality and the two parties might try to reach a mutually
beneficial agreement through the bargaining process. In this section it is shown that even
though those victims who would suffer a relatively large loss if information were revealed are
better off because of blackmail, the equilibrium of the bargaining game in which the
blackmailer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the victim is not always efficient. Intuitively,
efficiency requires that information is disclosed only if the damage to the victim is lower than
the market price (which is assumed to reflect the value of information to the rest of society).
Under asymmetric information this condition will not be satisfied because the blackmailer
will demand a payment which exceeds the market price. As a result a penalty which induces
the blackmailer to lower his demand will increase social welfare.
Consider the case of blackmail as a legally enforceable contract under which the
victim agrees to pay the blackmailer a sum of money in exchange for the guarantee that
information will not be revealed.5 Suppose further that the blackmailer can make a take-it-orleave-it offer by demanding x dollars from the victim in exchange for the promise not to
reveal the information. The victim will agree to pay x to the blackmailer only if the demand
is lower than the damage suffered if information is revealed, that is if x  L . The
blackmailer’s demand thus will be rejected with probability F ( x ) , implying that his expected
profit is given by:
R ( x )  pF ( x )  (1  F ( x )) x

(1)

The optimal payment demand x  must satisfy the first-order condition for the maximization
of the expected profit in Equation (1), which is given by:

4

Log-concavity is a standard regularity condition which is satisfied by most commonly used probability
distributions (Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 2005).
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Note that this assumption implies that blackmailer can credibly commit to making a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
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R ( x  )  ( p  x  ) F ( x  )  1  F ( x  )  0

(2)

The log-concavity of F () implies that F  /(1  F ) is an increasing function. In other words
we must have F ( x)(1  F ( x))  F ( x) 2  0 . The second derivative of the expected profit
function is given by
R( x )  F ( x )( p  x )  2 F ( x ) 
1

 F ( x )(1  F ( x ))  2F ( x )2   0
F ( x )

(3)

where the second equality was obtained by using (2) to solve for p  x* and substituting the
resulting expression in (3). Therefore, the assumption of log-concavity implies that the
second-order condition for profit maximization is satisfied.
To show that the blackmailer’s optimal demand x  always results in a deadweight
loss, note that (2) implies that R ( p )  1  F ( p )  0 . Because R ( x  )  0 , and from (3) we
know that R () is a decreasing function, we conclude that x*  p , i.e. equilibrium demand
always exceeds market price. This result is not surprising since the market price constitutes
the disagreement payoff of the blackmailer in this bargaining game. Consider now the
following three cases which enumerate possible relationships between market price, damage
suffered by the victim and the blackmailer’s optimal demand.
(i) L  p  x* . In this case the blackmailer’s demand will be rejected and the information will
be disclosed. This is an efficient outcome because the victim’s damage is lower than the
market price of the information. Note that in this case, the victim also has an incentive to
disclose the information himself.
(ii) p  x*  L . In this case the victim will agree to pay x* and sign a non-disclosure contract
with the blackmailer. This is an efficient outcome because L  p .

(iii) p  L  x* . In this case the victim will refuse to pay and the information will be
disclosed, which results in a deadweight loss because the social value of the information
disclosure, p  L , is negative.

6

The equilibrium corresponding to case 3 and the range of victim’s types which result in a
deadweight loss are illustrated in Figure 1. The expected deadweight loss in this case is given
by



x*
p

( s  p )dF ( s ) .

Figure 1. Deadweight loss from blackmail
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The fact that equilibrium of the bargaining game is inefficient from the social point of
view when the victim’s type falls in the interval ( p, x * ) provides a justification for the
criminalization of blackmail. Note however that the outright prohibition of blackmail does
not by itself improve efficiency: in the absence of bargaining between the blackmailer and the
potential victim, information will be revealed in all of the three cases above. This will result
in a net loss in Cases 2 and 3. In this model therefore blackmail could be welfare enhancing
as long as the payment demanded is not too high compared to the market price of the
information, allowing most of the “high damage” types (those with L  p )

to avoid

disclosure.
To improve on the equilibrium outcome government or social planner can impose a
punishment for blackmail which would decrease the blackmailer’s optimal demand. For
example, consider a version of the above bargaining game in which the victim either
accommodates the blackmailer’s demand or, if the demand exceeds the damage, rejects it and
7

simultaneously reports the blackmail to the authorities. In this case, a non-disclosure
agreement can no longer take the form of a legally enforceable contract. However it is
reasonable to expect that the blackmail agreement can still be achieved as an equilibrium
outcome of the interaction between the blackmailer and the victim when the blackmail is a
criminal offence. Indeed, if the blackmailer reneges on his promise and reveals information
after being paid by the victim, the latter can always report the case of blackmail to the
authorities ex post. The possibility of this outcome would provide the blackmailer with a
sufficient incentive to stick to his part of the deal. Alternatively, as pointed out by Gomez and
Ganuza (2002) there might be other ways for the blackmailer to regain his commitment
power even if the victim has no incentive to report the blackmail ex post. In particular, these
authors provide several scenarios in which commitment arises endogenously due to the
reputation effects or repeated nature of the relationship between the blackmailer and the
victim when blackmail is not subject to legal regulation.
As an example of a possible incentive scheme in the criminal blackmail regime
consider the case in which the blackmailer is liable to pay a monetary penalty equal to t  0
if the blackmail is reported to the authorities. The purpose of this penalty is not to make
blackmail prohibitively costly, but to change the blackmailer’s behaviour at the margin in
order to reduce the deadweight loss. The assumption that punishment for blackmail takes the
form of a fine is made for analytical convenience. In principle, t is meant to represent the
dollar value of all costs (including jail time, if any) imposed on a person found guilty of
blackmail. Under this assumption the blackmailer’s objective function is then given by
R ( x )  ( p  t ) F ( x )  (1  F ( x )) x

(4)

This form of punishment thus simply reduces the blackmailer’s payoff in case his demand is
rejected by the victim. The first order condition then becomes
R( x )  ( p  t  x ) F ( x )  1  F ( x )  0

(5)

In this case the optimal demand x* (t ) will be a function of the penalty for blackmail. Note
that (4) and (5) taken together imply that

8

F ( x )2
x

0
F ( x)(1  F ( x))  2 F ( x) 2
t

(6)

The optimal value of the penalty would solve the problem of minimizing the deadweight loss
resulting from blackmail subject to the incentive compatibility constraint which ensures that
the blackmailer would prefer to screen victim types by engaging in the bargaining process as
opposed to simply selling information on the market. That is, the optimal blackmail penalty tˆ
must

minimize



x* ( t )
p

( s  p )dF ( s ) ,

subject

to

the

constraint

( p  t ) F ( x* (t ))  [1  F ( x* (t ))]x* (t )  p . Because the incentive compatibility constraint
implies that x* (tˆ)  p , when the penalty is set at the optimal level equilibrium demand will
be given by x* (tˆ)  ( p, x0* ) , where x0*  x* (t  0) . While in general the regulatory remedy
against blackmail need not take this particular form, it is clear from the discussion above that
in this model some form of punishment for blackmail will be welfare enhancing despite the
assumption of costless information acquisition.

2.2 Social value of information and criminalization of blackmail
The main qualitative results presented in the previous sections were obtained under the
assumption that the market price of information p coincides with the social value of
information disclosure, which implies that revelation is efficient when net social surplus
p  L is positive. Under this assumption bargaining under symmetric information always

results in a Pareto efficient outcome and inefficiency of blackmail arises due to the absence
of trade under asymmetric information when the victims type falls in the interval ( p, x* ) .
Because it is possible that the blackmailer will not capture the full social surplus from
information disclosure it is important to study how this assumption affects the main
conclusions obtained in the previous section. To this end, let V denote the social value of
information which is assumed to exceed the blackmailer’s payoff ( V  p ). In this case
revelation is socially efficient if and only if V  L  0 . We have to consider the following
cases:
(i) V  x* . Because bargaining results in information disclosure when L  x* , information
revelation will be inefficient when V  L  x* . On the other hand, information is suppressed
9

when V  x*  L , which is an efficient outcome. Therefore in this case the main qualitative
conclusion from the previous section remains valid: blackmail can result in inefficient
disclosure of information, and this inefficiency can be alleviated by punishing blackmail on
the margin.
(ii) x*  V . In this case disclosure, which occurs in equilibrium when L  x* , is always
efficient. If information is not disclosed ( x*  L ) then the outcome is inefficient when
x*  L  V . In this case the blackmailer’s demand is too low from the social point of view.

On the other hand, the bargaining outcome is efficient when x*  V  L .

The overall conclusion emerging from the preceding discussion is that divergence
between the blackmailer’s private payoff and social value of information disclosure would
change the conclusions reached in the previous section when the social value of information
is much higher than the market price and also exceeds the blackmailer’s optimal demand and
the victim’s damage ( p  x*  L  V ). In this case a social planner would not want to
diminish the blackmailer’s demand on the margin (as described in section 2.2) but simply to
prohibit blackmail altogether.
Because the qualitative results of the previous section are overturned when social
value of information is much larger than the market price one might be interested in
considering the types of situations in which this condition is likely to occur. The most
prominent example is perhaps the case of information about a criminal offence committed by
the potential target of the blackmailer’s demands, when the society is likely to place a much
higher value on information revelation than a blackmailer would. One way to restore
efficiency in this case would be to prohibit blackmail (by imposing a sufficiently large
penalty) only when information relates to a crime. This however would require the
blackmailer to be able to infer whether the case at hand is a criminal offence or not and
proceed accordingly, which might not always be an easy task. A viable alternative to the
complete prohibition of blackmail would be for the social planner to signal the social value of
information by providing sufficient incentives for the informed party to reveal it. If these
incentives are set at an appropriate level the outcome will be efficient. Examples of such
incentives include monetary rewards for providing information about a criminal act or social
status and recognition obtained by whistleblowers who reveal socially valuable information.
More generally one would expect that in cases when the social value of information is
10

particularly large the society would come up with an appropriate incentive scheme to ensure
an efficient outcome. It is the criminalization of bargaining agreements which do not impose
large external costs on other members of society which makes criminalization of blackmail
paradoxical and which is the main focus of the argument for punishing blackmail developed
in the previous section.
3 Bribery
Having demonstrated the rationale for criminalization of blackmail, we will show now that
similar reasoning can be applied to the bribery paradox. To emphasize the differences
between blackmail and bribery we study an ultimatum game in which the potential victim can
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party to enter into a legally binding nondisclosure
agreement in exchange for monetary compensation. Thus in the bribery game the distribution
of bargaining power is reversed compared to the case of blackmail. In general the victim
might or might not know the price at which the blackmailer can sell information to other
parties. For this reason most of the analysis is conducted under the assumption of asymmetric
information. Section 3.2 provides a brief discussion of the case in which the potential victim
is fully informed.

3.1 Asymmetric information about market price
Let L denote the victim’s damage from disclosure and suppose the victim’s beliefs about the
market price p are summarized by the cumulative distribution function H () , which is
assumed to be continuously differentiable and log-concave. The victim will choose the bribe
level y to minimize the expected loss which is given by
D ( y )  L (1  H ( y ))  H ( y ) y

(7)

That is the victim’s offer will be accepted only if it exceeds the market price of information
and rejected otherwise, in which case the victim will suffer a damage L .
The optimal bribe level must satisfy
D ( y * )  ( y *  L) H ( y * )  H ( y * )  0

(8)
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Note that the second order condition for the minimization problem can be written as


1
( H ( y* ) H ( y* )  2 H ( y * ) 2 )  0
*
H ( y )

(9)

By log-concavity of H () the term in parenthesis is negative, which implies that the second
order condition is satisfied. The structure of the victim’s decision problem implies that the
optimal bribe level can never exceed the actual damage, i.e. it must be the case that
y * ( L)  L . This intuition is verified by noting that D ( L)  H ( L)  0 and that D () is an
increasing function. As in the case of blackmail the equilibrium in this game is not efficient.
The inefficiency in this game stems from the fact that a victim with damage above market
price might find it optimal to offer a bribe which is lower than the price and get rejected.
However, it is easy to see that punishing bribery will not be welfare enhancing. Consider the
following three cases.
(i) p  y* ( L)  L . In this case the offer will be accepted and no information will be revealed,
which is an efficient outcome because p  L .

(ii) p  L  y* ( L) . In this case the offer will be rejected and information will be revealed,
which is also efficient.
(iii) y * ( L)  p  L . In this case the offer will be rejected and information will be revealed,
resulting in the deadweight loss.

The inefficiency arises in case (iii) because the bribe level is too small compared to the actual
damage. In particular, the deadweight loss is increasing in the distance between y * ( L) and
L , implying that punishing bribery would be counterproductive.

3.2 Publicly known market price
It might be interesting to consider the case in which the market value of information is known
to the victim with certainty, while the damage from disclosure remains their private
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information. The plausibility of this assumption will vary form case to case but it is easy to
imagine a situation in which it might be valid. For example, a celebrity at the risk of
exposure might have a good idea about the price tabloids would pay for given information.
With this additional assumption the nature of equilibrium will depend on the social
value of information disclosure, p  L . In particular, if L  p , then both, the blackmailer and
the victim would have an incentive to disclose the information, and equilibrium is socially
efficient. Conversely, if L  p , then in the bribery game the victim can make a take-it-orleave-it offer x  ( p, L) which will be accepted and information will not be disclosed.
Therefore when the party affected negatively by the disclosure has the bargaining power and
is fully informed about the market price, the bargaining outcome will always be efficient. In
this, admittedly, special case the difference between blackmail and bribery becomes much
sharper: a legal system that prohibits blackmail and simultaneously allows bribery constitutes
the most efficient arrangement from the society’s point of view.
Efficiency of bribery when the market price is known by the victim is an example of a
well known result from the literature on the bilateral trade with asymmetric information.
When a seller with publicly known costs engages in bargaining with a buyer whose value of
the object is not known to the seller, an arrangement in which the buyer can make a take-itor-leave-it offer, would maximize social welfare. Once the analysis of the case of publicly
known price is rephrased in terms of bilateral bargaining setup, the answer to the question
what is the most efficient allocation bargaining power between blackmailer and victim
becomes apparent. Thus the main point of this sub-section is not to re-iterate this well known
fact but simply to point out that it could be fruitfully applied in the analysis of the blackmail
and bribery puzzles.
An important caveat that must be kept in mind here is that this argument can, in
principle, go both ways. In particular, if the victim’s damage but not the market price is
publicly known, efficiency would require allocating all of the bargaining power to the
blackmailer. This information structure however is not very likely to occur in practice:
because the full damage will include monetary as well as psychic components, it seems
reasonable to assume that the amount of damage inflicted on the victim is his private
information. The market price, on the other hand, could be learned by any interested party
including the potential victim. For these reasons we feel that the emphasis of the paper on the
assumption of private (as opposed to public) information about victim’s damage is justified.
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper the puzzles of blackmail and bribery were addressed in a unified framework of a
stylized bargaining game with asymmetric information. In contrast to the previous
approaches to the problem of blackmail we do not assume the blackmailer has to incur real
costs to acquire information about the potential victim. In this simple setup presence of
asymmetric information implies that punishing blackmail but not bribery will improve social
welfare. In particular, because the blackmailer does not bear the cost from the revelation of
information, his equilibrium demand will be too high relative to the social optimum and some
form of regulatory remedy might appropriate. On the other hand, the equilibrium bribe
offered by the potential victim always lies below the socially optimal level, implying that
punishing bribery would be counterproductive. The solution to the blackmail and bribery
puzzles proposed in this paper is complementary and distinct from the existing theory of
blackmail developed by Coase (1988), Ginsburg and Shechtman (1993) and extended by
Gomez and Ganuza (2002).
There are several extensions of the model which could further improve our
understanding of the paradoxes of blackmail and bribery. First, the assumption of take-it-orleave-it bargaining structure can be relaxed by considering an infinite horizon game in which
in each period the blackmailer decides whether to reveal information or to come up with a
lower demand, conditional on the previous demand being rejected. A problem of this kind
was considered by Fudenberg et al (1987), who studied a model in which an incompletely
informed seller has an outside opportunity of selling a good to another party. They found that
the presence of outside option resulted in existence of multiple equilibria, which poses
additional challenges to welfare analysis.
A related issue that might be addressed is repeated blackmail, i.e. a situation in which
the blackmailer keeps coming back with new demands over time. In this paper the possibility
of repeated blackmail was ruled out by the assumption that the parties can enter into a legally
binding non-disclosure agreement. In the absence of this type of contracting, the durability of
information makes the blackmailer’s problem similar to the problem faced by the monopolist
selling a durable good (Coase, 1972). In this case even high damage victim types will lack an
incentive to comply with the blackmailer’s demands if they expect to be blackmailed again in
the future. A dynamic model of bargaining between the blackmailer and the victim could be
used to understand how blackmail can take place in the absence of credible commitment
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mechanisms and how a lack of commitment might affect the rationale for criminalization of
blackmail.
Finally, an interesting extension of the model would be to consider a setup in which
the bargaining power is shared among the two parties. As argued in section 3, when the
market price of information (or alternatively, the blackmailer’s payoff from revealing it) is
known to both parties it is socially efficient to allocate all the bargaining power to the
potential victim. However, when only the blackmailer knows his payoff from information
revelation the question of welfare maximizing allocation of bargaining power becomes a nontrivial one. As an alternative to the simple ultimatum bargaining assumption one could adopt
a mechanism design approach in the spirit of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). In this
setting an efficient outcome cannot be guaranteed under any mechanism, but it still might be
of interest to consider the effects of criminal and legal blackmail regimes. These extensions
are left for future research.
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